considerable amount of development was carried out
on the crew escape system, especially in view of
the two-man crew requirement. We have estimated from
simulated escape sequences that the completion of
escape takes an average of approximately 8 seconds,
from the time the pilot begins to order the observer
to escape, to the point at which both men are clear
of the aircraft.
Crew escape time checks and tests were made on one of the Arrow mockups,
and full scale ejections were made from the cockpit of the static test aircraft,
using a dummy (Fig. 20). Film records indicated that the dummy's legs fouled
the instrument panel during ejection, but it was considered that the behaviour
of the dummy had not been entirely representative of that of a live occupant,
and additional tests were made at the R.A.E. by the Martin Baker Company, with
Ejection from the Arrow is completely automatic. The pilot pulls
the seat blind, this first triggers the canopy mechanism and, when the clamshell
canopy has reached its full travel, the seat automatically ejects, and the pilot
is later ejected automatically from the scat.
To improve the time of ejection, we are now considering a linked
escape system, with the pilot ejecting both the observer and himself from one
control, which we estimate would cut down the escape time to 2.5 seconds.
It is also proposed to carry out ejections from a supersonic rocket
sled to demonstrate as fully as possible that the emergency canopy opening and
crew ejection mechanisms function correctly, and that crew members can be safely
ejected clear of the structure over the full flight envelope.
would be impossible in a relatively short paper to
deal adequately with our wind tunnel programme, which
involved some 4,000 runs and 4,000 hours of tunnel
time at various facilities in Canada and the United
States, including the Ottawa tunnels of the National
Aeronautical Establishment, the Cornell Laboratories
at Buffalo, the N.A.C.A. Langley Field and Cleveland
tunnels, and the supersonic tunnel at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. Fig. 21 lists the major
tests made up to the present time. The amount of
data collected, especially on basic aircraft stability,
the early stages of preliminary design, it was decided
by the R.C.A.F. that the ground support equipment
should be designed concurrently with the basic aircraft,
to allow the squadrons to be trained and equipped
well ahead of the receipt of operational aircraft.
It was also realised that with an aircraft of the
complexity of the Arrow this equipment would, in
any case, be required when the first few aircraft
started their flight test programmes.
A ground support design group was set up over three years ago within
the Engineering Division to design those items required for satisfactory operation
of the aircraft, and R.C.A.F. personnel joined this group to form a team which
would evaluate and resolve the equipment received for the service readiness hangars
and general turn-around equipment. A typical case is shown in Fig. 22.
were made on maintenance facilities and, as the design progressed,
a number of conferences were held on the engineering mockups to establish
the times of replacement and inspection of every equipment item on
the aircraft. This group also prepared a proposal outlining a method
for providing the personnel and skills required to maintain the complete
Arrow weapons system, including the organising of maintenance personnel
and recommendations for training programmes for ground crews.
programme of building on the CF-100 had been carried
out by the conventional method of building two prototype
aircraft with minimum tooling, then building 10 pre-production
aircraft on harder tools and, on the 13th aircraft,
going into full scale production on relatively sophisticated
tooling. Our timing, from the start of design in
1946 to delivering the first production aircraft
was approximately six years.
On the CF-105, it was obvious from the outset that, based on its
greater complexity, even the first aircraft could not be built by hand methods
and a certain amount of fairly hard tooling would be required. In addition, our
schedule was to be very tight, from the time of initial design, to delivery to
In considering the method to be followed, we were also aware of the
change in philosophy which was taking place in the United States on the basis
of the Cook-Craigie recommendations, which provided for elimination of prototypes
and experimental drawing and tooling, the first aircraft being built from production
type tooling, and from production drawings.
However, the manufacturers who had followed this philosophy at that
time had previously had either research aircraft of the general configuration
of their production vehicle, or had, in fact, built prototypes before going ahead
with a production article. For instance, in thecase of the F.102, considerable
development work had been done on the XF-92 research vehicle, and two prototypes
had been built before going into full production on the F.102, whereas we had
a completely new and complex aircraft, without the benefit of a research vehicle,
and the engineering gamble which had to be taken, due to the gaps in our knowledge,
On the other hand, there did not appear to be time to build prototypes,
develop them, and then re-issue production drawings incorporating the changes
found from development.
The decision was made, therefore, jointly between the Company, the
R.C.A.F., and the Canadian government to proceed with a number of development
aircraft on the basis of a production type drawing release from the outset. In
other words, it was decided to take the technical risks involved to save time
on the programme.
Production personnel worked along with the Design Office to check
and advise on produceability as the design went along. Detailed layouts, part
prints and material specifications were all issued on a full production basis.
Drawings were made full scale on glass cloth or vinyl transparencies to assist
checking and allow these drawings to become masters for tooling templates, and
so on. Full scale plastic templates were made up from the initial lines lofts,
to be used as references and tool patterns by Manufacturing. Permanent type tools
were made up throughout the build of assembly jigs, sub-assembly jigs, and detail
tools. Fig. 23 (a) shows the main assembly jig and Fig. 23(b) shows one of the
large milling machines purchased to mill the inner wing skins.
A full scale metal mockup was made from the detail tools as they
became available, and this mockup acted not only as a tool proving device, but
was also used to train the production crews who were to build the first flying
aircraft, and was used by Engineering as a check, and later, as a development
tool. Where the correct material was not available, many parts of the mock-up
were made from soft material, and some parts were made by hand to bring it up
to a state of completion a little earlier than would have been the case if we
had waited for permanent tooling. While every attempt was made to keep this mockup
up to date with all changes, this happy state was never achieved, since the first
aircraft was coming along fairly quickly behind the metal mockup.
I will not pretend that this philosophy of production type build
from the outset did not cause us a lot of problems in Engineering. However, it
did achieve its objective, and has provided us with more development airframes
on which to do development flying and checking.
FIGURE 23(a). Arrow main assembly jig. FIGURF, 23(b). Machining Arrow
examining the number of aircraft to be used in the
test programme, we were again very conscious of the
time element, and it was obvious that we would need
a relatively large number of aircraft to obtain the
development flying necessary on the airframe, engine,
fire control system, and armament.
The Air Force examined the programmes which had been carried out
in the United States, to ascertain the approximate number of flying hours required
in a contemporary development programme. However, on examination, it was obvious
that Canada could not afford to go for such an extensive programme, with up to
50 development aircraft, and a compromise was made with 15 aircraft being established
as straight development vehicles for the various components, with an additional
21 aircraft for the R.C.A.F.'s evaluation programme, before these aircraft went
into operational service. The portions of the programme for which these aircraft
will be used is shown in Fig. 24.
first engine running in the aircraft took place on
4th December 1957, taxi trials were started on Christmas
Eve, 1957, and the first flight was made on 25th
Stage One of the flight test programme on the first aircraft covered
the period from first flight until the 23rd April 1958, i.e. the first 29 days
of flying, during which nine flights were made.
The first two flights were for pilot familiarisation, the aircraft
flew super- sonic on the third flight and, on the seventh flight, reached
a speed well over 1,000 miles per hour at an altitude of 50,000 ft.
in a climb while still accelerating.
Most of the early flying was done by Jan Zurakowski, Avro Chief Development
Pilot. The aircraft was also flown by F/Lt. J. Woodman, R.C.A.F. Evaluation Pilot,
and "Spud" Potocki, Avro development pilot
Most of these flights, beyond the third, were at supersonic speeds,
but the aircraft was not flown to it's, maximum speed capability at any time
during these early flights.
Practically all of the flights have been made at weight considerably
in excess of the mission weigh estimated for the Mark 2 operational aircraft,
since the installed weight of the J.75 engines is higher than the installed weight
of the Iroquois, and ballast is also required in the nose to balance this extra
weight Average take-off weight has been around 67,000 lb., and landing weights
have been in the order of 54,000 lb.
Basically, this first series of tests were to evaluate the general
handling qualities of the aircraft over as much of the flight envelope as possible,
to evaluate the flying control system and damping system, to check instrumentation
and telemetry techniques, and to check safety under adverse conditions, such
as one engine throttled back, induced oscillations, and so on.
following comments were extracted from the pilots'
nosewheel can be lifted off by very gentle
movement of stick at just over 120 knots.
speed is about 170 knots A.S.l., with an aircraft
attitude of about 11deg.
is rapid, with negligible correction required,
and no tendency to swing.
touchdown speed is a little over 165 knots
(the normal landing procedure is to stream
the drag chute on touchdown when the nosewheel
was no indication of stalling at the maximum
angle of attack at 15deg.
steadily improved with speed.
of trim was negligible except in the transonic
region, where small changes of trim were required.
attention was required by the pilot to prevent
turns, stick force was moderate to light, but
always positive with no tendency to pitch up
sideslip, the aircraft was a little touchy
with-out the damper, but excellent with damper
quote the pilots, " In general, the handling
characteristics and performance of the aircraft agreed
well with estimates."
This series of flights provided an excellent start to, our flight
test programme. After the Stage One flying, the first aircraft was given a thorough
inspection and was flying again on 7th June on Stage Two Testing. On the 11th
flight on 11th June, we had an unfortunate accident due to a failure of the undercarriage,
which put the aircraft out of commission for several months.
Because of the excellent photographic coverage which we obtained of
the accident, we were able to assess the cause very quickly. The aircraft
had touched down with the port leg twisted, and was in this condition
during the whole of the 4,000 ft. run. I have included some of these
photographs as a matter of interest.